

Fifty Years After Merger: Nashville and Davidson County's Experience with Consolidated Government

The third in a three-part series examining local government mergers

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As American metropolitan areas expanded and changed in the aftermath of World War II, many faced challenges resulting from growing populations and geographic dispersal across multiple jurisdictions, straining services, the tax base, and regional infrastructure. Political scientists and civic boosters began to consider different types of government reform to address the changing needs of the nation's cities, with city/county consolidation gaining significant attention. In Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee's politicians and business leaders found the idea of consolidation a potential answer to the problems the city was facing with regard to inadequate services, poorly allocated resources for the city and county school districts, and the city's declining tax base. Boosters also believed a significant, progressive government reform would set up the city to succeed in the future. After nearly a decade of political wrangling, state constitutional changes, and a failed merger effort in 1958, Nashville and Davidson County became the first major government consolidation in the post-war years when referenda passed within both the city and the county in 1962. This report examines the process of this successful consolidation campaign and the 50 years since the merger in order to understand the various benefits and drawbacks from merging governments with regard to government services, economic development, and population growth.

Background on Nashville

Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, is located along the Cumberland River and is in the center of Davidson County's 533 square miles. In 1960, the U.S. Census Bureau defined the Nashville area to be coterminous with Davidson County.¹ At that time, Davidson County was home to nearly 400,000 people, while residents of Nashville accounted for just over 170,000 of that total. Davidson County had grown by 24 percent since 1950 while Nashville's population declined by just under 2 percent.² While Davidson County grew steadily since the start of the 20th century, growth shifted significantly toward the portion of the county beyond Nashville's boundaries after the Great Depression, a common trend among American cities in the 1950s. However, the suburbanization of Davidson County beyond Nashville's city limits was predominately a phenomenon among the white population. At the same time that the African-American population of Nashville grew from 28 percent in 1940 to 38 percent in 1960, the black population of Davidson County declined from 22 percent to 19 percent. The rapid growth of Davidson County's population, particularly the areas just beyond Nashville's boundaries, raised expectations and public demand for urban infrastructure and services equal to those in the city.

Year	Nashville ³	% Change	Outside Davidson County	% Change	Davidson County	Nashville's % of County	Rest of County
1900	80,865	n/a	41,950	n/a	122,815	65.84%	34.16%
1910	110,364	36.48%	39,114	-6.76%	149,478	73.83%	26.17%
1920	118,342	7.23%	49,473	26.48%	167,815	70.52%	29.48%
1930	153,866	30.02%	68,988	39.45%	222,854	69.04%	30.96%
1940	167,402	8.80%	89,865	30.26%	257,267	65.07%	34.93%
1950	174,307	4.12%	147,451	64.08%	321,758	54.17%	45.83%
1960 ⁴	170,874	-1.97%	228,869	55.22%	399,743	42.75%	57.25%

The Nashville economy of the late 1950s and early 1960s could be considered “diversified...with a moderate amount of manufacturing,” including “DuPont, Ford Glass, Gates Rubber, and Genesco.”⁵ The city also specialized in banking and insurance, “often called the ‘Wall Street of the Central South.’”⁶ Additionally, government services associated with national, state, county, and city government, and educational institutions, highlighted by Vanderbilt University, played major roles in the region’s economy. Nashville was run by a strong mayor-council system, with a mayor serving four-year terms and a 21-member city council, which was comprised of 20 councilors elected by district and the vice-mayor, who presided over the council and was elected at large.⁷ Ben West served as mayor of Nashville from 1951 through consolidation. A county court/county judge system governed Davidson County. The county court served as the legislative body consisting of “55 magistrates elected from 16 civil districts,” including the city of Nashville, and shared administrative responsibilities with the county judge.⁸ While representatives from Nashville should have comprised a significant proportion of the county court based on the city’s population, Nashville was “seriously under-represented” because the county had “not been reapportioned since 1905.”⁹ At the time of consolidation, Beverly Briley was the county judge, having been elected in 1950. Both the city and county were dominated by the Democratic Party during the 1950s and 1960s; therefore, Nashville and Davidson County’s politics were factional, divided along city and suburban/rural lines rather than partisan lines.

Race Relations and Nashville’s African-American Community

In the 1950s, Nashville was still a segregated Southern city. However, many of the city’s white residents considered their community to be racially progressive. For example, while the state of Tennessee maintained a poll tax through 1953, the city itself abolished its poll tax in the early 1940s. It should be noted, though, that some of the efforts to end the poll tax were about limiting the impact of political machines rather than advancing an equal-rights agenda.¹⁰ The city’s African-American community actively participated in post-war civil rights activism, seeking to eliminate racial disparities within both the political and economic realms.

The perception among some political and community leaders in the 1950s of Nashville's progressive racial attitudes started at the top of the political structure, with Mayor Ben West. When West was vice mayor and then mayor in the late 1940s and 1950s, he sought support from the African-American community; backed the two African-American city council members: Z. Alexander Looby and Robert E. Lillard; advocated for redistricting that created African-American majority districts; maintained a "black cabinet that met every Saturday morning;" and appointed African-Americans to prominent city boards.¹¹ However, Mayor West often acted with politics, rather than principle, in mind, as was evident in the aftermath of Nashville's lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, muddying his support among his black constituents. The mayor's official comments on the sit-ins sent mixed messages, stating both that "anyone could legally request service at lunch counters," but also that protesters could be arrested for sitting "at a lunch counter closed to all patrons," a tactic that the activists had begun employing.¹² Additionally, Mayor West met with local leaders of the sit-ins and established "a biracial committee to mediate between merchants and students," but the conclusions drawn retained the status quo, and much of the African-American community began to renounce their support for Mayor West and the established power structure.¹³

In general, white Nashvillians saw their home as a moderate Southern city, but continued to cling to segregation when it impacted them directly, especially in their children's schools. The city's elite lauded the election of two African-American city councilors and tried to include at least some African-Americans on many boards and commissions. However, even the most prominent African-Americans were not always safe from harassment, as when Councilor Looby's home was bombed during the lunch counter sit-in movement. Nashville's African-American community worked within the existing political structure in the 1950s, which brought some advancements, but much of the promise was never fulfilled.

NASHVILLE'S PATH TOWARD CITY/COUNTY CONSOLIDATION

Earliest Efforts to Address Metropolitan Problems

By the early 1950s, community and political leaders began to recognize the numerous issues that would lead to the creation of a consolidated city and county government, commonly referred to as Metro Nashville ("Metro"), though the solution at the time was unclear. Rapid suburbanization in Davidson County created challenges for the distribution of government services demanded by suburban residents. These challenges included the lack of a sewer system for 100,000 suburban residents; minimal police protection; a system of private fire departments (and high insurance bills associated with them); an overly strained water system run by the city, only partially extended to the suburbs; a dearth of streetlights and sidewalks throughout the suburbs; and inadequate parks and playgrounds. The two school districts within the county "produced duplication and waste, with vacant city classrooms and overcrowded county schools."¹⁴ The lack of services was a source of hidden taxes for suburban residents. For example, as one Nashville chronicler noted at the time, private fire department subscriptions plus the increased insurance premiums due to the substandard fire protection "means that the suburban dweller actually pays more, per capita, for tenth-class fire protection than residents of the City of Nashville pay for third-class fire protection."¹⁵ Multiple taxing and service districts resulted in confusion and a lack of oversight from

elected officials, and created “difficulty in planning for...orderly growth.”¹⁶ In addition to the disparity of services between the city and county, “the maze of public and private bill collectors... [had] become both complex and unjust.”¹⁷ City taxpayers had a disproportionate burden when it came to public works and roads used by urban and suburban residents alike; the park system was paid for exclusively by Nashville taxpayers even though “70 percent of the park acreage is located outside the city limits.”¹⁸

The recognition of Nashville’s problems led to the creation of multiple task forces and study commissions. A 1951 study by the Tennessee Taxpayers’ Association recommended “one completely consolidated unit of local government,” and the establishment of a Community Services Commission by the state legislature in 1952.¹⁹ The Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the city of Nashville released a report in June 1952, *A Future for Nashville*, which made a series of recommendations to address the problem of metropolitan growth beyond Nashville’s limits. While not going as far as to recommend city/county consolidation, the report advocated for an annexation of 90,000 people and 69 square miles of the county into the city limits. The report cautioned that “Nashville could not hope to grow” while constrained by outdated city boundaries.²⁰ Annexation was also perceived to be a more viable option due to “the constitutional bar on establishing two tax rates.”²¹ Finally, the report recommended making public health, hospital care for indigents, public schools, and welfare solely county responsibilities.

In the aftermath of these reports, Nashville and Davidson County made some of the recommended changes. Davidson County took on many new functions over the course of the 1950s, including public health. Nashville turned over all of its welfare programs to Davidson County in 1953.²² And some arrangements were made to allow suburban students to attend certain specialized city schools.²³ However, civic leaders deemed these changes insufficient to deal with the many challenges the region still faced. At a Rotary Club meeting in June of 1955, “County Judge Beverly Briley urged...that a single areawide [sic] government be established,” the first public mention of consolidating Nashville and Davidson County by a political leader.²⁴ Over the latter half of the 1950s, consolidation supporters in Davidson County—ranging from Judge Briley to local business leaders—made it clear that they viewed consolidation as a preferable option over annexation because a negotiated expansion of the city would result in “a shift of power to the county structure” and “was a way of managing the need for city growth on terms favorable to, or at least accountable to, the county.”²⁵

The 1958 Consolidation Effort

The summer that Judge Briley made his comments on consolidation, a group was hired by the planning commission to study the feasibility of expanding sewer service into urbanized portions beyond Nashville’s boundaries. A subset of the engineers and academics who began work on this project disagreed with the idea of a special services district and began to craft a proposal for consolidation designed to win the favor of both Judge Briley, who was known to support consolidation, and Mayor West, who preferred annexation.²⁶ After the proposal for a metropolitan government was presented to the planning commission and a series of alterations to appease Mayor West’s skepticism were made, the plan was made public via the local newspapers in October 1956. This kicked off the public portion of a process that would lead to a 1958 referendum on consolidation.²⁷

In order for consolidation to become a viable option, the state constitution needed to be amended; this occurred in 1953 by a statewide referendum. The state legislature, with the guidance of Judge Briley and the Davidson County delegation, established a legal mechanism for consolidation in 1957. The new law stipulated that any Tennessee city with more than 200,000 people could establish a “metropolitan government” in coordination with their home county by first establishing a charter commission and then winning an affirmative vote both within the city and county.²⁸ Shortly after this law was enacted, Mayor West and Judge Briley appointed a group of civic leaders to form the first Metropolitan Charter Commission. Members represented a cross section of the city and county, including wealthy and lower-income members, teachers, African-Americans, and both labor and business leaders.²⁹ Commission meetings were open to the public, with 11 meetings specifically intended to gather community feedback, though “they were poorly attended.”³⁰ The commission’s plan, released on March 28, 1958, called for a consolidated government run by a metropolitan mayor and a 21-member elected council—15 by district and six at large.³¹ The proposed charter would have divided the county into two separate districts—a general services district and an urban services district—each with its own tax rates based on the breadth of services provided. The incorporated cities and towns within Davidson County would become part of the general services district, with additional services provided by the independent city governments that would remain, unless residents voted to change their status.³²

The 1958 consolidation campaign can be characterized by support from prominent institutions and an opposition that remained mostly quiet until the final week before the vote. Support was headlined by the two, usually opposing, local newspapers, *The Tennessean* and the *Banner*, which actively campaigned in support of the Metro proposal. Beyond penning editorials and printing positive letters, municipal news coverage during 1958 highlighted the deficiencies “of waste disposal and traffic control,” implying that Metro might resolve these and other issues.³³ The mayor and county judge, while rhetorically supportive, failed to wield the full weight of their political machines. Some local politicians suggested that support from the county judge and mayor might actually have been “unenthusiastic ‘lip service.’”³⁴ The Nashville Chamber of Commerce, League of Women Voters, Nashville Trades and Labor Council, the Tennessee Taxpayer’s Association, and the Tennessee Municipal League all came out in favor of the referendum.³⁵ The Chamber of Commerce established a citizen’s committee, which promoted metropolitan government, though “no attempt was made to organize a ‘grass roots’ organization in support of the proposal”—an oversight viewed by some as a fatal blow for consolidation.³⁶ Much of the committee’s efforts focused on erudite explanations of the charter through newspaper columns and meetings of educational and civic organizations, ultimately reaching a relatively narrow subset of the county’s electorate and engendering a false confidence among the committee by speaking to audiences already sympathetic to Metro.³⁷

The opposition “unleashed a bitter whirl-wind attack” the week before the vote; it focused on rural and suburban skepticism of the central city and connected the proposal to an international communist plot.³⁸ The opposition’s last-minute campaign was aimed predominately at the county, assuming that the city was solidly behind the referendum, and argued that Metro would result in higher taxes, fail to bring new services to residents, let the city “gain dictatorial powers over them,” and expand liquor sales into the suburbs—and included vague threats of “socialism” and “big government.”³⁹ These arguments would

resurface during many other cities' consolidation efforts. The bulk of the opposition was made up of members of the Quarterly Court, the county's equivalent to a city council; suburban schoolteachers; and private police and fire companies.

When voting day came on June 17, 1958, the proposal passed within the city limits, but failed by a significant margin in the outer suburban and rural portions of Davidson County, dooming the referendum to failure.

1958 Consolidation Vote⁴⁰

	For	% For	Against	% Against
Nashville	7,797	61.86%	4,808	38.14%
Davidson County	13,790	41.07%	19,790	58.93%

When examining the voting results, a couple of trends can be discerned. Supporters of the referendum tended to be more educated and better off economically. Voters who had completed "some college were more than two to one in favor."⁴¹ High-income voters supported consolidation by a ratio of 3-to-1, in contrast to low-income voters, who opposed consolidation by a ratio of 2-to-1, and middle-income voters, who were evenly split. These two trends correspond with the type of organizations that supported consolidation before the vote, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, the Rotary, the Jewish Community Center, and several PTAs, which often attracted more educated members.⁴² The only three county areas to support charter were the wealthiest suburbs, bolstering these findings.⁴³

While Nashville voters supported consolidation by a comfortable margin, African-American voters were somewhat less likely to support the referendum, as evidenced by the fact that "both of the districts which had [African-American] representatives on the city council voted against the plan by 51 and 58 percent."⁴⁴ Some opponents within the African-American community recognized the reality that "the Charter's adoption would have more than doubled the white population of Nashville, while adding only slightly to its [African-American] population."⁴⁵ African-American community leaders in Nashville were looking forward to a future of substantial political power within the city, and even the possibility of a black mayor. On the other hand, some white supporters of consolidation were concerned about the growing political power of the African-American community and "viewed Metro as an expedient by which this might be prevented."⁴⁶ Some African-Americans were also skeptical of the pro-growth business interests at the forefront of the consolidation campaign, after negative experiences with urban renewal efforts in the late 1940s and 1950s that targeted the heart of the city's black business district.⁴⁷

In a survey of local politicians, those who predicted a defeat of the 1958 referendum cited various reasons for their prognoses, including lack of voter information, fears of higher taxes and increasing power in a single Metro executive, and a general sense of distrust among city and suburban residents.⁴⁸ These reasons both parallel and foreshadow arguments made by opponents to city/county consolidation in a number of other cities in post-war America. Other Nashville observers at the time argued that proponents' failure to implement any grassroots or door-to-door campaigning doomed the referendum.⁴⁹

A stark city versus county acrimony could also help to explain the failure of the referendum—voters living farther away from the city and rural residents of Davidson County are believed to have considered the vote against merger as a vote against the city.⁵⁰

The Aftermath of the Failed 1958 Vote

In subsequent years, Nashville's leaders attempted to address the city's challenges in varied ways. Their efforts engendered significant frustration throughout Davidson County and catalyzed a new campaign for consolidation. Within one month of the failed referendum, Mayor West had shifted his attention to the option pushed by the Community Services Commission—annexation. The failure of Nashville to annex any county territory between 1929 and 1958 had been a key reason that the urbanized area now extended so far beyond the city limits.⁵¹ In 1955, legislative delegations from the state's large cities, with support from the Tennessee Municipal League, passed new legislation authorizing cities to annex neighboring unincorporated areas without a vote by the residents.⁵² In July 1958, "the city annexed seven square miles of industrial and commercial property...on the grounds that these areas 'belonged' inside the city since they were already receiving city services," increasing the population by just over 5,000 residents and adding important businesses to the tax rolls.⁵³ The city followed that annexation with a much larger one in 1960, when the city council voted to annex 42.46 square miles and 82,512 residents over the mayor's veto.⁵⁴ Although Mayor West had made a public statement against annexations without the support of annexed residents, which explains his veto, it is generally accepted that the council would not have overridden the veto without at least tacit support from Mayor West.⁵⁵ The 1960 annexation included 21 schools, creating problems between the Nashville and Davidson County school systems regarding compensation for the annexed schools and how to deal with more than 12,000 impacted students.⁵⁶ While the annexations did add to the city's tax base, the increases failed "to offset the tremendous cost of providing services to those areas."⁵⁷

In order to address some of the revenue shortfalls that the city faced, in 1959, Mayor West instituted a \$10 tax on cars that used Nashville streets for 30 days a year or more regardless of where the drivers resided, known as the "green sticker" tax due to the color of the sticker drivers put on their cars after paying the tax.⁵⁸ This resulted in significant uproar, particularly from the county, with charges of "taxation without representation," followed by noncompliance, which was aided by the obvious difficulty of enforcing the law.⁵⁹ In turn, the city council called for stricter enforcement, leading to a crackdown and arrests accompanied by \$50 fines. While the crackdown proved effective, the new tax bred animosity between county residents and the city.

The two expansions were very controversial among the annexed suburbanites and, along with the green sticker tax, permanently damaged Mayor West's reputation with them and dramatically reshaped the politics and future of consolidation. While annexation expanded the population and tax base, new problems were created when it became clear that the costs of extending services exceeded the new revenue. Residents of the annexed areas complained that their services were not noticeably improving

and blamed the mayor.⁶⁰ Problems created by annexation included hundreds of miles of roads needing to be brought up to “city street” standard; 4,000 of the 14,000 new school children requiring bus service, which the city had never previously provided; and the county losing nearly half of its road tax revenue, forcing increased property taxes.⁶¹

1962 Referendum Campaign

While the city was annexing portions of Davidson County, advocates for Metro were already reviving their efforts. A newly elected Quarterly Court, many members of which had campaigned on a pro-consolidation message, voted in 1960 to establish a new charter commission.⁶² However, the city council rejected a similar resolution just two weeks later, “by a vote of 10 to 9,” and tabled a second resolution, preventing a new commission from being appointed.⁶³ *The Tennessean*, whose editors generally opposed the mayor and lambasted his annexations, argued that “the solution to all of these problems was to be found in a new Metro attempt.”⁶⁴ However, the mayor, the city council, and the *Banner* initially rejected a new Metro attempt and wanted to see the annexation plan through. Mayor West’s change of opinion from pro-merger to pro-annexation between 1958 and 1962 primarily came down to the fact that, in 1958, it was presumed that he would become mayor of the newly merged city; however, by 1960, his political stock had fallen due to the green sticker tax and the city’s annexations, and a merged city likely meant an end to his political career. Additionally, Mayor West’s political rise relied upon a coalition that spanned many constituencies, including a substantial portion of the city’s African-American population. In order to achieve this broad base of support, he attempted to balance a slow, but deliberate, desegregation agenda with the expectations of the city’s white population of separate public facilities. This balancing act angered both sides of the desegregation debate at times, further damaging his political standing going forward. Despite his tepid support of desegregation, many African-Americans continued to see him as the closest thing they had to an ally in government.

After the city of Nashville rejected the proposal for a new charter commission in early 1960, the state legislative delegation, reading the political message sent via the county court election, sought an amendment to the act enabling consolidation that would allow another act of legislature to establish a charter commission. On March 9, 1961, such an act passed easily, and the Davidson County delegation established a charter commission just one week later, formally initiating the process for a second referendum for Metro.⁶⁵ Constitutionally, the new commission needed to be approved by the local legislative bodies or by a referendum of the voters. Due to the city council’s opposition to a charter commission, the legislature set up a referendum to approve the new charter commission, to take place on August 17, 1961. This preliminary referendum on establishing a new commission “saw the crystallization of new leadership and the formation of new citizens’ organizations in the community” to campaign for the proposal.⁶⁶ The charter commission vote passed overwhelmingly both inside and outside the city, in a light-turnout election.

Charter Commission Vote, August 1961⁶⁷

	For	% For	Against	% Against
Inside the city	11,096	74.84%	3,730	25.16%
County outside the city	7,324	65.56%	3,848	34.4%

The makeup of the new charter commission was almost identical to the old one, carrying more than eight of 10 members and the legal counsel. The final two spots were named by Mayor West and County Judge Briley.⁶⁸

The new charter commission began deliberations by taking the 1958 charter and assessing it for potential changes. One major difference this time around was the amount of public interest; the new commission held “several public meetings,” 75 full meetings, and countless subcommittee meetings.⁶⁹ One noteworthy area of contention regarded representation on the Metro council. African-American leaders, for example, hoped to minimize the negative impact consolidation would have on their growing political power by requesting automatic reapportionment and districts based purely on population, rather than area.⁷⁰ Additionally, the number of members of the Metro council was debated; the proposed 1958 charter called for 21 members, 16 by district and five at large. The new charter proposal ultimately called for a 41-member council—35 elected by district, with six of those districts drawn to be predominately African-American, and automatic reapportionment every 10 years based on population changes.⁷¹ With regard to the small, independent cities within Davidson County, the 1962 charter proposal allowed them to either retain their independence or “relinquish their charters and merge with the urban services district” at some point in the future.⁷² The 1962 charter proposal consolidated the city and county governments and provided for an expandable urban services district, initially to be the city limits, and a general services district covering the entire county.⁷³ Urban services included “police and fire protection, sewerage, street lighting and cleaning, and liquor control.”⁷⁴ The general services district covered “general administration, police, courts, jails, tax assessment, health, welfare, hospitals, schools, parks, recreation, public housing, transit, garbage collection, [and] libraries.”⁷⁵

Proponents in 1961 and 1962 focused their efforts on a more grassroots door-to-door campaign and used good versus evil rhetoric in which the democratic ideal of local control under Metro represented the good and Mayor West represented the enemy.⁷⁶ This was in stark contrast to the more high-minded 1958 campaign, which focused on the often-ambiguous idea of good governance and educating the electorate. The annexations and green sticker tax associated with Mayor West set him up as a villain for suburban residents in both the annexed portions of the city and the relatively dense neighborhoods just beyond the city boundaries, who believed themselves next in line for forced annexation. The grassroots campaign was led by the Citizen’s Committee for Better Government and James Roberson, though some contend that *The Tennessean* was actually behind the committee.⁷⁷ The Citizen’s Committee sought average citizens and women “from various walks of life” to spread a pro-Metro message block by block, and boasted as many as 1,500 canvassers.⁷⁸ Roberson credited Metro’s success to these canvassers,

many of whom were women, stating after the referendum vote that “the housewives did the job... walking up and down with their fact sheets.”⁷⁹ Roberson’s work began in 1960, as he campaigned to elect pro-Metro state legislators. By 1962, the League of Women Voters, the Council of Jewish Women, the Education Council, and various business and women’s clubs had affiliated with the Citizen’s Committee, successfully creating the broad coalition missing from the 1958 campaign.⁸⁰

A handful of prominent African-Americans also actively campaigned for Metro, including local professors, doctors, and the president of the local chapter of the NAACP.⁸¹ Some of the African-American pro-Metro advocates recognized that “consolidation would dilute the voting power of the [African-American] community,” but believed the interests of the entire community should take precedence.⁸² Z. Alexander Looby, an African-American city councilman, continued supporting consolidation, but on more pragmatic grounds. He argued that continued annexations would also dilute African-American voting power but without any assurances of redistricting, making the possibility of an even smaller share of council seats than African-Americans currently held.⁸³ Because Councilman Looby was an active participant in crafting the proposed consolidation charter, he was in the room to fight to prevent a city council heavily comprised wholly of at-large candidates and to draw council districts that ensured black representation.⁸⁴

The opposition, this time led by Mayor West, focused on using the mayor’s political machine to distribute anti-merger literature in order to defeat the referendum in the city. The focus on the city struck some as misplaced. In interviews conducted after the referendum vote, two key proponents of Metro questioned the opposition’s strategy, stating “that the anti-Metro forces could have defeated Metro had they concentrated on the county.”⁸⁵ The Goodlettsville Chamber of Commerce, located in one of the independent towns within Davidson County that would choose to remain autonomous, staunchly opposed Metro and led some efforts to disseminate information to support their position, aided by various government officials from Nashville, Davidson County, and other smaller cities within the county.⁸⁶ Opponents in the county rehashed many of the same arguments that had been made before the 1958 referendum—primarily the threats of higher taxes and fears of big government. Mayor West, however, utilized his political operation to oppose merger primarily due to personal political calculations—dissolving the city would likely, and ultimately did, result in the end to his career as an elected official.

A parallel campaign, led by Councilman Robert Lillard (Nashville) and the Davidson County Democratic League, focused on Lillard’s African-American base, and on the damage Metro would cause African-American voting strength and political power.⁸⁷ A potential decline in black community political strength was of great concern given the mayor’s lack of strong support for the integration of public accommodations and the city’s failure to adequately implement desegregation after the *Brown vs. Board of Education* decision⁸⁸. The city instead devised the *Nashville Plan*, a painfully slow “one-grade-per-year [integration] program,” which prevented substantive integration and ensured geographic segregation would replace statutory segregation.⁸⁹ Additionally, by the 1962 vote, an expanding portion of the black community had come to understand that “where growth and the expressed interests of black Nashvillians conflicted, growth won,” adding to their sense that the path toward consolidation’s promised economic growth may not be in their interests.⁹⁰

The main arguments for and against consolidation came down to a person’s view of the status quo. Throughout the campaign, The *Tennessean* framed the referendum in terms of Metro versus annexation, arguing that if Metro was rejected, no community in Davidson County would be safe from Nashville’s probable annexation plans. The paper highlighted complaints from annexed residents who were frustrated with the slow pace of expanded services from the city and continually repeated claims that the green sticker tax amounted to taxation without representation. Proponents also focused on corruption accusations against the Nashville police, along with the likely illegal use of city resources to campaign against Metro, to argue that the city, and Mayor West, was incapable of successfully governing. Arguments against Metro relied on the assertion that both Metro and annexation came with challenges, but Metro’s were greater and would take longer to resolve.⁹¹ Opponents argued that Metro was an unknown concept, and the problems with it were not yet apparent, while the city was a known entity, however imperfect. Mayor West and other Metro opponents also argued that they were, in fact, already providing a substantial amount of services in the annexed areas.⁹² Some opponents argued that the charter was “authoritarian, communistic, illegal, unconstitutional, and ‘another nail driven into the coffin of states’ rights,” and a plot “to promote collectivism.”⁹³ Thomas Anderson, a leader of the local John Birch Society, spoke often on these themes in the media as a prominent opponent.⁹⁴ A recently formed African-American voter registration organization, the Davidson County Democratic League, also actively campaigned against Metro, citing the loss of black voting power Metro would entail.⁹⁵ During the 1962 consolidation campaign, “rumor[s] persisted that Metro consolidation had extra urgency because whites feared a black mayor;” however, due to the reality that annexation was already occurring, the likelihood of absorbing white communities into the city was clear.⁹⁶

1962 Vote

On June 28, 1962, voters in Nashville and Davidson County realized the opportunity to decide the future of their city and region. In a significantly larger turnout, 40 percent more votes were cast than for the 1958 referendum, and consolidation passed with a favorable vote of 57 percent in the city and 56 percent in the county.

1962 Metropolitan Nashville Referendum Vote⁹⁷

	City Vote		County Vote	
In Favor	21,064	57.4%	15,897	56.0%
Against	15,622	42.6%	12,511	44.0%
Total	7,324	100.0%	28,408	100.0%

While the referendum passed within the city, the vote breakdown between the old city and the annexed area shows that it actually failed within the pre-annexation city limits, speaking to the effectiveness of Mayor West’s machine and opposition within the city’s African-American community. In the politicized nature of the referendum campaign, voters in the annexed areas remained frustrated with Mayor West and chose to vote against him and the city by supporting consolidation. One of the most important

differences between the 1958 and 1962 referenda was the urgency felt by the community. In 1958, Metro was marketed at fixing abstract problems that the city and county would face in the future. In the 1962 referendum, city voters were choosing whether to support Mayor West, while suburban voters viewed Metro as a referendum on the past annexations and potential future annexations. The green sticker tax was also a key element considered by suburban voters. Political scientist Brett Hawkins concluded that for the 1962 referendum: “[T]he best efforts of the pro-Metro forces would have been futile in the absence of annexation and the green-sticker episode.”⁹⁸ One historian, Don Doyle, read the 1962 vote totals as the “righteous suburbanites [rising] up in anger—this time to swallow the city rather than repel it,” in contrast to the 1958 vote.⁹⁹

1962 Vote Totals within the City of Nashville¹⁰⁰

	Old City	Annexed Area	Total
In Favor	45.2%	72.2%	57.4%
Against	54.8%	27.8%	42.6%
# of Votes	19,960	16,726	36,686

Upon passage, Metro opponents immediately filed a lawsuit seeking to stop the consolidation. The Chancery Court and state Supreme Court upheld the referendum, affirming the constitutionality of each step taken by the state legislature. The court also showed confidence in its ruling by pointing out that every step in the process had been approved by voters.

Elections for mayor and council for Metro Nashville were held in November 1962. Davidson County Judge Beverly Briley won the mayoralty with 62.8 percent of the more than 90,000 votes cast in his race versus Davidson County tax assessor Clifford Allen.¹⁰¹ Briley would go on to serve as Metro’s mayor for three terms, through 1975. On April 1, 1963, Nashville and Davidson County officially consolidated, marking the establishment of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County

Responsibility for services within the new metropolitan government was divided between an executive branch, a legislative branch, and various boards and commissions. The mayor, elected to a maximum of three four-year terms, heads the executive branch, and oversees multiple departments, including finance, police, fire, public works, water and sewer services, law, aviation, and others.¹⁰² The legislative branch consists of the metropolitan council, which has 41 members—40 councilmembers and one vice-mayor, elected at large. Of the 40 councilmembers, 35 are elected by geographic district and five are elected at large.¹⁰³ Additionally, the city has multiple boards and commissions with separate budgets and memberships appointed by some combination of the mayor and council. The most prominent board is a nine-member Board of Education, appointed by the mayor with council approval.¹⁰⁴ Other boards include the Metropolitan Board of Health, Metropolitan Board of Hospitals, Electric Power Board, Nashville Transit Authority, Metropolitan Planning Commission, Farmers’ Market Board, Agricultural Extension

Board, Metropolitan Traffic and Parking Commission, Metropolitan Board of Parks and Recreation, Metropolitan Welfare Commission, Public Library Board, Civil Service Commission, and the Metropolitan Employee Benefit Board. Ordinances that were already on the books for Nashville or Davidson County at the time of consolidation remained so “until repealed, modified, or amended” by the council.¹⁰⁵ The same held true for administrative boards or other agencies established prior to Metro. Six cities in Davidson County—Belle Meade, Berry Hill, Forest Hills, Goodlettsville, Lakewood, and Oak Hill—remained after consolidation, with Lakewood dissolving its city charter in 2011.¹⁰⁶

The other central division within Metro Nashville is between the General Services District (GSD) and the Urban Services District (USD). All of Metro Nashville is part of the GSD, including the independent cities. The USD initially consisted of the former city limits, including the annexed area, and has expanded multiple times since 1963 on authority of the Metro council. Over the first decade of Metro Nashville, the General Services District’s services included police, streets and roads, schools, parks, libraries, recreation, health, hospitals, and welfare. In addition to GSD services, the Urban Services District received “more concentrated police,” fire protection, water, sanitary sewers, storm sewers, street lighting, street cleaning, trash collection, and alcohol supervision.¹⁰⁷ Today, being a part of the Urban Services District provides “garbage collection, curbside recycle[ing], and street lights.”¹⁰⁸ The two divisions resulted in two different property tax systems: The entire city paid GSD taxes, while residents of the USD paid an additional tax to support their expanded services. Over time the Urban Services District has expanded and the rest of the county has increasingly urbanized, resulting in “the erosion of the distinction between the Urban Services District and the General Services District.”¹⁰⁹

IMPACT OF CONSOLIDATION

The following sections will assess how Nashville has fared since consolidation in the areas of population growth, economic development and employment, and government services and taxes, as well as the community’s perspectives on consolidation. Nashville is assessed in terms of the city itself, the Nashville Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and in comparison with 76 peer cities and 59 peer MSAs.¹¹⁰

Population

From the time of consolidation through 2010, Metro Nashville saw consistent growth each decade. The consolidated city’s 12.1 percent growth during the 1960s and 6.7 percent in the 1970s outpaced the average growth of all comparable cities over each period. Metro Nashville’s African-American population grew at a higher rate than the overall population in every decade since consolidation, and substantially so in the 1970s and beyond. This resulted in the African-American proportion of the consolidated city’s population steadily increasing from 19 percent at the time of the merger to 28 percent in 2010. However, it is important to note that African-Americans comprised 38 percent of the population of pre-consolidation Nashville, and fell to just under 20 percent of the post-consolidation population. Metro Nashville’s nonwhite population surpassed 38 percent by 2000, although this includes a significantly more diverse population.

	1960 ¹¹¹	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Nashville-Davidson County Population	399,743	488,003	477,811	510,784	569,891	626,681
Nashville-Davidson Growth Rate		+ 12.1%	+ 6.7%	+ 6.9%	+ 11.6%	+ 10.0%

When compared with all cities of more than 50,000 people in 1960, the population of Nashville significantly outperformed the Midwest and Northeast, and their census divisions, every decade since consolidation. Many of these cities were experiencing population declines due to suburbanization, white flight, and deindustrialization. When compared with Southern cities, however, Nashville’s growth mirrored the average city’s growth during both the 1960s and 1970s, and only exceeded Southern cities’ growth by two percentage points in the 1980s. Compared with other cities in the East South Central census division—including Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee—Nashville’s growth during the 1960s and 1970s lagged other cities by two to three percentage points.

Population Growth by Census Region and Division
for all Cities with a Population of 50,000 or more, by decade¹¹²

Census Region	Census Division	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2010
All	All	9.77%	-0.70%	3.24%	4.46%	2.67%
Midwest	All	8.81%	-7.27%	-3.38%	1.25%	-1.27%
Midwest	East North Central	7.88%	-8.71%	-4.28%	0.06%	-2.74%
Midwest	West North Central	11.46%	-3.12%	-0.41%	4.68%	2.96%
Northeast	All	-0.58%	-8.63%	-1.55%	-0.63%	0.35%
Northeast	Middle Atlantic	-1.87%	-10.18%	-3.76%	-1.55%	-0.60%
Northeast	New England	1.40%	-6.27%	1.90%	0.80%	1.85%
South	All	12.13%	6.60%	4.70%	7.05%	6.17%
South	East South Central	14.11%	9.50%	-1.52%	2.18%	2.89%
South	South Atlantic	12.17%	0.84%	5.20%	6.66%	6.92%
South	West South Central	11.22%	13.25%	6.72%	9.72%	6.57%
West	All	23.13%	9.93%	17.82%	13.01%	6.72%
West	Mountain	27.88%	17.86%	15.95%	24.14%	11.81%
West	Pacific	21.97%	7.99%	18.27%	10.29%	5.48%
Nashville-Davidson Metro		12.07%	6.65%	6.90%	11.57%	9.97%

However, it is important to consider the fact that Nashville had more similarities with Midwestern and Northeastern cities than many Southern cities, as evidenced by the fact that 77 percent of Nashville’s peer cities identified for this study are non-Southern cities. Nashville’s growth could not keep up with Western cities, however, which grew twice as fast in the 1960s, 50 percent faster in the 1970s, and three times faster in the 1980s.

When examined among peer cities alone, Nashville's growth again stands out. The consolidated city grew significantly faster than the average of all comparable cities in every decade since the merger. When broken down by census region, Nashville grew faster than the average Midwestern or Northeastern peer city each of the past five decades, and faster than Southern peer cities from 1970 through 2010. However, Southern peer cities within the East South Central division grew at a faster pace than Nashville in the 1960s and 1970s, suggesting that consolidation specifically might not have been the strongest catalyst of population growth, but rather the entire region was quickly growing due to a number of factors.

Population Growth by Census Region and Division
for Nashville's Peer Cities, by decade

Geographic Area		1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000	2000-2010
All		1.89%	-7.30%	-1.78%	0.92%	0.28%
Midwest		2.39%	-10.64%	-4.55%	-0.08%	-4.02%
Northeast		-5.48%	-11.25%	-2.01%	-2.24%	0.47%
South		13.10%	5.30%	3.65%	7.93%	7.81%
Midwest	East North Central	1.66%	-10.70%	-5.89%	-1.36%	-5.97%
Midwest	West North Central	4.51%	-10.46%	-0.68%	3.61%	1.58%
Northeast	Middle Atlantic	-5.63%	-12.85%	-4.53%	-2.78%	-1.04%
Northeast	New England	-5.19%	-8.38%	2.53%	-1.25%	3.19%
South	East South Central	14.65%	7.49%	-3.97%	3.51%	2.40%
South	South Atlantic	11.12%	4.46%	6.47%	8.47%	8.78%
South	West South Central	17.34%	2.48%	13.79%	18.75%	19.70%
Nashville-Davidson Metro		12.07%	6.65%	6.90%	11.57%	9.97%

Note: Red font signifies a rate of change that is lower than Nashville's.

The Nashville metropolitan area also grew at a strong rate every decade from 1960 until today, averaging nearly 20 percent growth per decade. The Nashville MSA outpaced average peer metro areas' growth by 29 percent in the 1960s; 348 percent in the 1970s; and between 200 percent and 235 percent in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. While Southern cities in general have grown substantially over the past 50 years, the Nashville metro area outpaced the average southern peer MSA in every decade. Nashville surpassed growth rates of both Memphis and Knoxville, and grew faster than the other southern peer cities that serve as state capitals: Richmond, Virginia, and Birmingham, Alabama. While Nashville did not grow faster than other peer cities in the East South Central census division, Nashville MSA outperformed East South Central peer MSAs by more than 50 percent in every decade since consolidation. Indianapolis' MSA saw a similar phenomenon after its consolidation, outperforming Nashville's peer metros in every decade since its 1970 merger with Marion County, and significantly outperforming cities within the Midwest census region and the East North Central census division.

Peer MSA Growth from 1960-2010

Census Region	Census Division	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2010
All	All	12.40%	4.86%	4.70%	8.20%	6.37%
Midwest	All	12.48%	3.38%	2.65%	7.83%	4.75%
Midwest	East North Central	12.57%	2.79%	1.04%	6.53%	2.89%
Midwest	West North Central	12.17%	5.37%	7.99%	12.17%	10.97%
Northeast	All	10.38%	0.19%	2.73%	2.84%	2.68%
Northeast	Middle Atlantic	8.15%	-0.61%	0.81%	1.99%	1.92%
Northeast	New England	13.88%	1.44%	5.73%	4.18%	3.88%
South	All	14.68%	13.01%	10.63%	15.28%	13.58%
South	East South Central	10.30%	13.48%	5.39%	13.88%	12.03%
South	West South Central	36.38%	24.44%	32.22%	29.38%	23.45%
Nashville-Davidson Metro		15.97%	21.74%	14.85%	25.14%	21.20%

Note: Red font signifies a rate of change that is lower than Nashville's.

Beyond simply population growth in the metro area, Nashville-Davidson also maintained a larger share of the metro area's population than many of its peer cities. Nashville comprised more than 50 percent of the Nashville MSA into the 1980s, at a time when many central cities were losing significant population to neighboring counties. While Nashville experienced suburbanization like much of the rest of the nation, because of consolidation, many of Nashville's suburbs remained within Metro Nashville's borders. This expansion captured the growth of suburban development and allowed Nashville to maintain more power in the region than other cities, with positive implications for economic development, planning, and the tax base.


While city and metropolitan area population growth can be reflective of a multitude of variables, one of the most important is the overall health of the economy. The next section of this report examines the state of the economy in the decades following the establishment of Metro Nashville, and suggests that a strong economy has been one important ingredient for Nashville's metro-area growth.

Economic Impact

Economic impact can be assessed in a number of ways. For the purpose of this study, we will examine employment levels, labor force participation, aggregate income, poverty levels, and the quality of the workforce based on education levels. When possible, both Metro Nashville and the Nashville Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) will be discussed.

Employment Growth

Employment within Nashville-Davidson grew at a significant rate over the first three decades after consolidation—19 percent during the 1960s, 25 percent during the 1970s, and 15 percent during the 1980s—and continued to grow by just over 10 percent both in the 1990s and 2000s.



These numbers compare favorably to Nashville’s peer cities. Nashville ranked 15th out of its 76 peer cities during the 1960s, sixth during the 1970s, 13th during the 1980s, ninth during the 1990s, and 16th during the 2000s. The other two consolidated cities within the peer city list—Columbus, Georgia, and Indianapolis—also performed well in the decades following their consolidation, with employment growing faster than 75 percent or more of Nashville’s peer cities each decade from 1970 to 2000. The number of jobs in the Nashville MSA grew by over 25 percent each decade from 1960 through 2000. This places Nashville among the top 20 percent of peer metros in the 1960s and in the top 5 percent from the 1970s through the 2000s. The other two consolidated cities examined, Indianapolis and Columbus, Georgia, on the other hand, did not perform particularly well compared with other peer MSAs. While Nashville fared well in employment in general, consolidation did not have an appreciable impact on manufacturing or construction jobs—placing Nashville in the middle of the pack among peer cities over the first two decades of consolidation. African-American employment also increased at significant rates since consolidation. Black employment growth lagged overall employment growth in the 1960s (19 percent overall versus 10 percent for African-Americans), but exceeded the overall employment growth rate in subsequent decades. This suggests that, in general, the African-American population was not left out of the strong economic development environment in the post-consolidation period.

African-American Employment Rate vs. Overall Employment Rate

	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2013
African–America Employment Growth	10.47%	35.25%	18.35%	23.61%	25.53%
Overall Employment Growth	19.60%	25.29%	15.17%	10.05%	10.88%

Labor Force Participation

According to a paper on labor force participation published by the Center for Economic Policy Research, “when the economy is booming, the labour [sic] force participation rate rises.”¹¹³ With this in mind, Nashville’s economy performed very well compared with similar cities during the 1960s and 1970s as the consolidated city’s labor force participation rate climbed from 56 percent to 60 percent to 65 percent in 1960, 1970, and 1980, respectively. While this coincided with generally strong labor participation rate increases due to more women joining the workforce, Nashville outpaced nearly all of its peer cities, ranking fourth during the 1960s and second during the 1970s. Any potential benefit consolidation had on labor force participation disappeared by the 1980s, however, as Nashville ranked in the middle among peer cities in each of the past three decades. Indianapolis, another major consolidated city, performed well among these peer cities during the 1970s, the first decade after its own merger with Marion County, but fell back toward the middle of the pack in its second decade as a consolidated city. Beyond Metro Nashville, the entire Nashville MSA has performed well when compared with the MSAs of peer cities. The Nashville MSA ranked in the top quarter in labor force participation growth rate in the 1960s, the sixth fastest MSA in the 1970s, and the 10th fastest in the 1980s.

Income and Poverty

The Nashville MSA saw substantial growth in aggregate personal income in the first two decades after consolidation. Aggregate income increased by 71.6 percent during the 1960s and 53.8 percent during the 1970s. These figures put Nashville toward the top of the list among peer MSAs, with income growth ranking sixth in the 1960s and first during the 1970s. From 1960 through 2013, Nashville’s aggregate income growth trajectory ranked fourth among all peer MSAs. However, neither Indianapolis nor Columbus, Georgia, performed particularly well during the two decades after their consolidations—the 1970s (30th and 33rd, respectively) or the 1980s (25th and 27th, respectively)—both ranking in the middle quintile each decade.

In the first decade after consolidation, Davidson County saw its poverty rate decline by nearly 50 percent—from 25.93 percent in 1959 to 13.75 percent in 1969. In raw numbers, 39,565 fewer people were counted as living below the poverty line in 1969 compared with 1959. Poverty declined by an additional 10 percent during the 1970s, before stabilizing between 12 percent and 13 percent from 1980 through 2000. The metro area’s poverty rate also declined significantly, by nearly half, from 32.16 percent to 16.21 percent between 1959 and 1969.¹¹⁴ Over this period, the number of people included in poverty calculations increased by more than 100,000, while the number of people below the poverty line declined by more than 80,000. During the 1970s, the MSA poverty rate declined again, this time by more than a quarter—from 16.21 percent to 11.76 percent. While a poverty rate above 10 percent is not a positive economic indicator, the Nashville metro area anchored by the newly consolidated Metro Nashville saw the third sharpest decline in the poverty rate among peer metro areas during the 1960s and the largest decline during the 1970s. These figures were likely impacted by the positive employment and aggregate income growth the Nashville MSA experienced over this same period.

However, it is important to note that poverty has remained a serious issue for Metro Nashville since consolidation. In the last census before consolidation, Nashville metro area's poverty rate of 32 percent ranked as the fifth highest among peer metros. After cutting the rate in half between 1959 and 1969, Nashville still had the seventh worst poverty rate among peer cities, as the federal government dramatically increased its efforts to combat poverty over the same period.

Educated Workforce


A highly educated workforce can be a valuable draw for companies looking to relocate and provide justification for homegrown companies to remain in place. In the first decade after consolidation, Nashville's proportion of college-educated adults increased by 92 percent, from just over 6 percent to 12 percent. This surpasses every other peer city considered.¹¹⁵ Some of this growth, however, can be entirely explained by the city limits capturing Davidson County's educated population. While this does take some of the luster off the 92 percent statistic, Davidson County's proportion of educated adults also increased by a significant amount, just under 43 percent, which ranked 10th among peer cities. While capturing Davidson County's educated suburbanites did not increase the quality of the regional workforce, it did bring their professional incomes and higher valued property onto the city's tax rolls. This also impacted local politics in important ways: More highly educated voters, at least in theory, are often more engaged in local affairs, though this engagement can crowd out the voices of incumbent residents, often minorities and lower-income groups. Indianapolis and Columbus, Georgia, also ranked in the top 10 among peer cities with a growth rate of college-educated adults of nearly 50 percent during the 1960s. However, any potential benefits consolidation had for Nashville over other similar cities all but disappeared by the 1970s. Even though Nashville's proportion of college-educated residents increased by 54 percent and 68 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, no discernible advantage existed when compared with the performance of peer cities.

Government Services, Taxes, and Budgets

Before and during the campaigns for consolidation in Nashville, advocates of government reform focused on issues related to government services, cost, and constituent access. The most pressing needs for the city centered on extending services deeper into the growing suburbs of Davidson County, particularly sewer and fire protection, and paying for the urban services already in place in the center city. Beyond expanding services throughout the county, supporters argued that consolidation would "equalize core-city and suburban services" and finances, foster a "professionalization of [government] personnel," and "eliminate city-county bickering and buck-passing" among multiple governments.¹¹⁶ Opponents, on the other hand, worried that consolidation would create a "more centralized government which would be less responsible and less accessible to the people," raise taxes, reduce the quality of services by spreading resources too thin, and cause "a dilution of [African-American] political influence in local government decisions."¹¹⁷

City Expenditures and Services

The picture of the change in Nashville’s taxes, expenditures, and services over the first two decades of consolidation is a complicated one. During the campaign for consolidation, advocates argued that “the costs of government will rise whether we have Metropolitan Government or retain city and county governments,” but consolidation “will be a means of slowing down the upward tax spiral.”¹¹⁸ When examining city budget figures, government costs grew at a faster rate after consolidation than before, which can be observed by multiple metrics. Overall government expenditures grew approximately three times faster in the first decade after consolidation than the preceding decade.¹¹⁹



The growth of Nashville’s expenditures during the decade before consolidation placed it just below the spending of the top one-third fastest growing cities. However, in each of Metro Nashville’s first two decades, the city’s expenditure growth was among the 10 cities with the fastest growing expenditures, meaning not only did Nashville’s expenditures increase, they increased at a more rapid pace than most of its peer cities. City employment and total payroll followed a similar trajectory. The number of city workers nearly doubled when comparing the 10 years before consolidation (1953-1962) and the 10 years immediately after (1963-1972). Total payrolls in the first 10 years of consolidation increased at nearly three times the rate of the previous 10 years. Total payroll rose faster than city employment, likely because public worker salaries for former county and city workers were brought into parity, resulting in raises for many county workers.

Increases to both city expenditures and the number of employees cannot be considered surprising, as consolidation advocates focused on calls for expanded urban services into suburban communities—such as sewers, sidewalks, and improved roads—which not only justified a larger city workforce but was also appreciated by many residents, particularly those in the expanded Urban Services District. This is an important consideration for cities looking at consolidations. Consolidations often come with expanded service delivery, and even if services are meant to remain consistent, many jobs cannot be eliminated through efficiencies—including police, firemen, and public works employees, for example—but often, county employees’ salaries rise to match their higher-paid counterparts in the old city. While public services were expanding into suburban neighborhoods in the county, improved services were not always experienced within the former city limits, particularly in heavily populated African-American neighborhoods. Low-income neighborhoods within the former city shared “common, open-air taps for their drinking water” well into the 1960s, at the same time that suburban sewer service became a priority for Metro Nashville.¹²⁰ This reinforces historian Don Doyle’s idea that consolidation was a “swallow[ing of] the city” by the county, with county interests trumping some city needs, and validates African-American community skepticism of talk of growth by city boosters.

While overall spending increased, analysts still managed to identify some cost savings in specific areas due to consolidation. According to political scientist Daniel Grant, Nashville was able to find efficiencies in “eliminated...wasteful duplication,” particularly in upper management and savings from consolidated purchasing of equipment and supplies, but simultaneously unleashed a “civic revolution of rising expectations [for government services] which can only result in an upward stimulus on expenditures and taxes.”¹²¹ A more recent analysis, published in 2010 by Anthony Nownes, David Houston, and Marc Schwerdt, found that “consolidation did indeed lead to more efficient government” and that spending growth was slower than without consolidation.¹²² Some of these cost savings and efficiencies can be found while examining service expansions made possible by consolidation. Before Metro was established, engineers for Davidson County developed a plan for adding water and sewerage for the county, which would have created additional costs for the city. The new Metro government’s plan saved “an estimated one million dollars in construction costs, plus \$50,000 a year in operating costs.”¹²³ Another example arose when considering the Department of Public Works’ road maintenance program, which was significantly aided by the ability to “purchase specialized equipment which neither the city nor county alone could have justified.”¹²⁴ The county’s recreation programs and parks were also significantly expanded in the first 10 years of consolidation, as centralized resources could better be used to plan more broadly throughout the area.¹²⁵ The same idea applies to the school district, which will be discussed later in this section.

In addition to local expenditures from local revenue sources, because of consolidation, “Metro has been able to obtain significant amounts of federal aid to experiment with new methods of solving urban problems.”¹²⁶ This benefit affirmed County Judge Beverly Briley’s belief, espoused throughout the run-up to the referendum, that consolidation would lead to an increase in federal funding.¹²⁷ Many federal programs determine their grant amounts based on population and on regionalism, both areas that Nashville enhanced through consolidation. In 1960, the U.S. Census Bureau defined the Nashville metro

area as only Davidson County, and in 1970, the definition still only included three counties. Therefore, actions taken by Metro Nashville were considered regional actions. Beyond federal grants, the city became “eligible for increased amounts of State aid” after consolidation based on the larger population and its designation within the state as both a city and a county.¹²⁸

While public data and academic analyses of consolidation’s impact on city expenditures are admittedly mixed, advocates for a consolidated Nashville and Davidson County did not particularly emphasize arguments that a merged city would save money or create valuable efficiencies. Instead, they contended that a fairer system would be created and tax increases could be minimized by spreading the tax burden among a larger swath of the region’s population. Researchers James Coomer and Charles Tyler argued in the early 1970s that consolidation allowed an equalization of “core-city and suburban services,” which was consistently the most prominent argument in favor of consolidation.¹²⁹ Beyond the city’s spending, consolidation allowed Nashville to raise its statutory debt limit, leaving the city in a stronger fiscal situation.¹³⁰

Taxes

Advocates of consolidation saw two distinct, and somewhat conflicting, motivations for merger with regard to taxes: to prevent taxes from significantly rising through efficiencies while spreading the tax burden more fairly among city and suburban residents. Opponents honed in on taxes as one of their most important arguments against consolidation, contending that consolidation would result in “substantially” higher taxes and that the rural residents of the county would not actually see benefits from their more expensive tax bills.¹³¹ Again, it is important to keep in mind that advocates and opponents expected taxes and expenditures to rise in the coming decade, but advocates such as the Tennessee Taxpayers Association and Judge Briley believed that taxes could best be stabilized in a consolidated government.

Before and after consolidation, city residents paid both Nashville and Davidson County taxes, while county residents paid Davidson County taxes, in addition to the fees for specific services, such as private fire protection. After consolidation, residents living in the older city limits fell under the Urban Services District (USD), while the entire county paid General Services District (GSD) taxes. People in the Urban Services District paid both USD and GSD taxes. The chart below shows tax rates for both city and county residents in the last year before consolidation and three separate years in the first decade of Metro Nashville.

Nashville-Davidson Property Tax Rates, per \$100 in assessed value¹³²

	GSD Only	USD Only	USD Total
1962–1963	\$2.32	\$3.00	\$5.32
1963–1964	\$3.70	\$2.00	\$5.70
1968–1969	\$3.50	\$1.80	\$5.30
1972–1973	\$4.11	\$1.89	\$6.00

A couple of things become clear from these figures. First, every resident of Metro Nashville saw an increase in property taxes, and city residents continued to pay more than county residents—45 percent more in 1973. Second, residents outside the old city limits saw a much larger tax increase than city residents. Within the USD, residents saw a 13 percent increase, while county residents saw a 77 percent increase over the same period. Although county residents’ tax bills increased, the amount of spending within the General Services District grew significantly as Urban Services District spending declined, and suburbanites “are now paying for services which they formerly received free.”¹³³ From a tax fairness perspective, Metro succeeded at shifting “the tax burden so that those who benefit from services...pay for them.”¹³⁴

Police and Fire Protection

The establishment of Metro Nashville included consolidating the police departments of both Nashville and Davidson County. Nashville’s police department had developed a reputation for “graft and corruption,” and consolidation offered an opportunity to reorganize the force, get a fresh start, and rededicate efforts toward better training and the recruitment of more highly educated cadets.¹³⁵ Following the establishment of Metro, the new minimum level of service across the county increased to a level equal to the maximum level of service of the former city and county departments.¹³⁶ This occurred without costs ballooning: Law enforcement costs grew at a consistent rate both before and after consolidation, with a slightly lower growth rate in the first five years of Metro than the previous five years.

Expenditures on Police Protection
In thousands (2013 dollar values)

	1957	1962	1967	1972	1977	1982	1987	1992
Nashville-Davidson	\$18,686	\$26,481	\$36,973	\$56,484	\$76,518	\$78,819	\$87,174	\$105,651
Change in Expenditures on Police Protection		42%	40%	53%	35%	3%	11%	21%

The expanded service, new recruitment efforts, and more uniform enforcement added up to positive results. In 1965, major crimes had declined by 7 percent in Nashville, as similar crimes increased by 5 percent nationally.¹³⁷ The new police force also gained the trust of residents throughout the county, as can be seen in the chart below.

Attitudes Toward Adequacy of Police Protection in Neighborhoods
in General Service District and Urban Service District¹³⁸

Attitude	General Services District		Urban Services District		Total	
Good Enough – Very Good	188	71%	85	66%	273	70%
Not So Good	63	24%	34	27%	97	24%
Not Good at All	14	5%	9	7%	23	6%

With regard to fire protection, the most important impact of consolidation was a substantial expansion of territory protected by the Metro fire department. Additionally, thousands of new fire hydrants were installed throughout the USD, significantly reducing fire insurance rates and providing better protection.¹³⁹ However, it took until “the early 1980s before the fire service was expanded ‘pretty well countywide.’”¹⁴⁰

Nashville and Davidson County School

One of the major sticking points of previous efforts at creating either a partial or countywide government was the animosity that existed between the Nashville and Davidson County school districts. To address these concerns, the charter established a two-year transitional period where each school district would continue functioning independently while the Metropolitan School Board could be established to ultimately take over. Once the Metropolitan School Board was in place, nine school districts were established, with one school board member for each.¹⁴¹ While the school board has control over budget expenditures, the budget is set by the Metro council. If the school board disagrees with the appropriation, they have the power to bring a referendum before the voters to create an additional tax levy.¹⁴²

As the school systems merged, major issues remained. One issue focused on the minority student population, which Nashville had struggled to fully integrate. In response to the Brown decision, the city school board began a “one-grade-per-year” integration plan to delay full integration as long as possible, while also increasing funding for black schools, building new ones, and hiring more black teachers, tacitly recognizing that the schools were both separate and unequal.¹⁴³ After the school districts consolidated in 1966, the Metro Nashville School board abandoned this slow plan for full integration. In practice, according to historian Sonya Ramsey, this decision “had little impact because the board’s [original] plan did not call for the transportation of children from segregated public schools to desegregated ones in other areas.”¹⁴⁴ However, at least on paper, “statistical desegregation...was achieved in most (but not all) Nashville schools” largely because of the consolidation of the school districts.¹⁴⁵ Although Metro Nashville’s schools were officially desegregated, significant segregation remained based on the school board’s assessment of where schools should be built. The new Metro Nashville school board completed a study of existing schools and future needs. The 1964 report, titled *Schools for 1980*, “revealed the depth of metropolitan government bias toward suburban spaces and against schooling in urban ones,” a preference that also privileged white areas of the city over African-American neighborhoods.¹⁴⁶ By 1970, the school board’s policy explicitly stated a preference for single-family neighborhoods, shortchanging residents of apartment complexes located in more urban settings.¹⁴⁷ School site acreage requirements also made construction of new schools in denser, urban areas prohibitively expensive. Beyond exacerbating segregation, this decision again shows the dominance the suburban neighborhoods continued to hold over urban communities.

Funding disparities between the suburban Davidson County system and the urban Nashville City system arose as another significant issue to grapple with after consolidation. Before the merger, property taxes were distributed between the two school districts through “artificial and often inequitable formulas based upon average daily attendance,” resulting in unhelpful rivalries among the administration and

generally stoking city versus county rivalries.¹⁴⁸ Following consolidation and the establishment of a more straight-forward funding mechanism, “salaries were equalized, teacher transfers were made easier to obtain, and a flexible rezoning of school service areas made possible the transfer of many former county students to previous city schools, and vice versa.”¹⁴⁹ Distributing students throughout the system allowed for significant cost savings within the first year, with one observer noting that “over one million dollars was saved in school construction alone.”¹⁵⁰ Equalizing pay among teachers and consolidating countywide administration helped to eliminate the rivalry between city and county schools, increase the morale of teachers and administrators, and engender a more positive learning environment.¹⁵¹ The consolidated school system could shift resources to where the students actually lived, following relocation patterns from the city to the suburban communities as those neighborhoods grew, while ensuring that schools serving students within the old city limits maintained funding as the tax base shifted.

Community Opinion

Once Metro had been implemented, survey data suggested that the majority of citizens were generally satisfied with the new government. By 1970, residents approved of Metro by a 5-to-1 margin.¹⁵² While it is not surprising that residents were generally favorable toward Metro, as a majority of both the city and suburban voters approved Metro in the first place, post-consolidation polling showed larger support than expected. When the survey data examined certain questions or specific groups, the claim that Metro has been popular is even stronger. Consolidation opponents argued that a larger government would be less responsive to residents’ needs, particularly the concerns of rural residents and suburbanites living on the edges of the county. These concerns resonated with voters, as 66 percent of rural voters opposed consolidation in 1962.¹⁵³ By the late 1960s, however, “residents of the rural-urban fringe believed they had received improved services and were satisfied with the consolidation,” even as their taxes had risen precipitously.¹⁵⁴ Suburbanites not only found Metro to be responsive to their concerns, but they also found Metro to be “generally more efficient”—and that the new system made it “easier to know whom to call or see when you have a problem.”¹⁵⁵ This trend included residents within the old city as well, as support for Metro rose to 80 percent by 1964, after old city voters opposed consolidation in the 1962 referendum by 55 percent to 45 percent.¹⁵⁶

The African-American community had mixed feelings regarding consolidation during the run-up to the referenda, particularly in 1962, with many recognizing there would be “a dilution of...political influence,” among African-American voters.¹⁵⁷ This concern was evident during each of the referendum votes; heavily African-American voting precincts barely supported a merger in 1958 after heavy politicking by Mayor West and voted against merger in 1962. In the late 1950s, Nashville’s political observers believed it was only a matter of time before the city elected an African-American mayor, based on the population demographic trends. While it was impossible to know if and when an African-American might have been elected mayor of Nashville, no African-American has yet been elected mayor of Metro Nashville, while 45 percent of peer cities have had African-American mayors, including Memphis and Knoxville in Tennessee. Beyond the mayor’s office, Metro was initially designed to include six majority African-American council districts. While this number was the same as the number of members prior to consolidation,

African-American representation in the Council dropped from 28 percent to 13 percent. This left African-Americans underrepresented in local government, as 19 percent of Metro was African-American at the time of consolidation. Outside of electoral politics, the dominance of suburban voters in the mayoral election also had negative implications for African-Americans' representation on administrative boards, as "[t]he new...Charter gave the mayor appointive power over all...boards, including education, planning and housing."¹⁵⁸ The decline in political influence over the city's governmental power brokers led some observers to argue that consolidation was "a 'counter-revolution' to the progress of the civil rights."¹⁵⁹

However, there was not uniform opposition to Metro before or after its implementation; in the mid-1960s, black voters "expressed slightly greater satisfaction with 'the way Metro has worked' than did white voters."¹⁶⁰ According to State Senator Thelma Harper, a former member of the Metro council, although African-Americans supported Metro at the time of consolidation, "many of them just didn't know what was going on," and were more focused on school integration and busing.¹⁶¹ Concerns about political representation combined with positive survey data paint a muddled picture of consolidation's impact on the African-American community, which has mirrored the results of other major city consolidations across the country.

Conclusion

Consolidation has primarily served Nashville and Davidson County well. The most important benefits for the city and region rested in the expansion of vital services into the suburbs, particularly those neighborhoods nearest to the pre-annexation Nashville boundaries, and the creation of a fairer tax system. Throughout the 1950s, discussions of problems in Nashville and Davidson County often began with a lack of sewers in the expanding suburbs, and inconsistent and often subpar fire protection. These two issues began to be addressed in earnest almost immediately after consolidation. The merged school districts provided an opportunity to fully utilize existing classroom space as changing housing patterns of the 1950s and 1960s progressed. Opponents of consolidation were right, however, to be concerned about their tax bills, as taxes, particularly outside the old city limits, increased dramatically. However, these suburban communities did receive promised services, disproving part of opponents' fears. These expanded services did come at significant costs, as Nashville saw some of the fastest expenditure growth during the 1960s and 1970s when compared with peer cities. From a government service delivery perspective, "it appears that many of the problems that consolidation was designed to fix were indeed fixed early on."¹⁶²

Consolidation also gave a measurable boost to the city with regard to population and economic growth, and slowing regional sprawl. Nashville's population grew between 6 percent and 12 percent in every decade from consolidation through 2010. This is particularly noteworthy in the 1960s and 1970s, a time when many cities in the nation were experiencing population loss due to suburbanization and white flight, and consolidation "helped the city to retain a viable tax base."¹⁶³ The population growth extended to the entire MSA, as the Nashville region grew faster than peer metro areas in every region except the census division that included Texas, in every decade since consolidation. Metro Nashville's

population also maintained a strong share of the MSA's population, comprising well over half the total population through the 1980s, while cities such as Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia saw their populations increasingly spread into neighboring counties, diminishing these cities' power within the region. The region's economy displayed several positive indicators as well. Employment, labor force participation, and aggregate income all grew at a significant rate over the past 50 years, outperforming the vast majority of peer cities, particularly in the first two decades after the merger. Davidson County's poverty epidemic declined significantly in the first decade of consolidated government, aided by strong employment and income growth and a more secure tax base for the city to expand crucial services for economic development, though poverty has remained a serious issue for the city. Metro Nashville's stronger economy also helped increase the number of college-educated adults in the county by more than 40 percent in the first decade of consolidation, making the workforce stronger and building a foundation for continued economic success. While Nashville metro area's economic success and population growth cannot be purely pinned on consolidated government, unified leadership and stronger municipal services due to merger were likely important elements to economic growth.

Major government reform like Nashville's can have less tangible benefits as well. Local merger advocates recognized this reality when they argued that consolidation would help to "create a progressive-community image in the national spotlight."¹⁶⁴ From the earliest years of Metro, boosters and politicians have argued that "metropolitan government seemed to provide a general boost to the spirits of Nashville and Davidson County" and played a significant role in putting the city on a path toward where it is today.¹⁶⁵ In a retrospective on consolidated government 50 years after the merger, a former editor at *The Tennessean*, John Seigenthaler, argued that "consolidation seemed to trigger [Nashville's] ascendance as a modern Southern city" and that "it would be 'hard to imagine' Nashville opening its doors to professional sports," and by implication, being recognized as a major American city, without consolidation.¹⁶⁶ These "soft" benefits have consistently been discussed in other cases of city/county consolidation as a major achievement. While enhancing a city's reputation and engendering pride within a city are valuable, it is difficult to isolate whether these benefits arise due to consolidation, or if consolidation was only possible because of strong political leadership, allies in the business community, and galvanized neighborhood leaders—the same elements that can move a city forward regardless of government reform.

While by many metrics, Metro Nashville has been a stronger performer in the post-consolidation era, it is important to consider the challenges Metro has either caused or exacerbated. First and foremost, consolidation has damaged minority political power by incorporating predominately white suburbs into the city limits. This has had implications for representation on the city's legislative body, appointment to vital city boards and administrative agencies, and influence on a mayor who does not necessarily need to consider minority and low-income communities' challenges to be re-elected. The consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County shifted the trajectory of African-American political power off a path leading to a very large role in city politics and mayoral elections, to one that took multiple decades to simply regain a similar level of political influence that the African-American community held in 1960. Second, and strongly related to the first, suburban influence on city decision-making has increased dramatically. Judge Briley predicted this reality when he first began discussing a potential consolidation,

and his three terms as Metro mayor showed his prediction to be true. While a strong urban core is important to broad, citywide strength, suburban politicians may be more inclined to view the city core as an economic engine, rather than a neighborhood, resulting in different policy priorities.

Even with these political challenges, Nashville is, overall, in a better position to succeed because of consolidation with Davidson County. Because the Nashville region was still very concentrated within and immediately around the city limits, with some rural areas beyond, the essential benefit consolidation brought was an orderly expansion of urban services. Consolidation also afforded the city a more unified economic and planning vision in the first two decades, allowing the region to gain an economic advantage over that period. By the 1980s, or 1990s in some cases, many of the advantages brought by consolidation had dissipated. This left Nashville to function more or less as many other cities, albeit with a stronger economic, population, and tax base on which to stand moving forward. Today, most cities are surrounded by mature suburbs, already capable of providing “urban” services. However, even though the specific benefits of expanded sewer services, fire protection, and mundane urban necessities like sidewalks and streetlamps might already exist in the suburbs, all cities could benefit from a more regional perspective on service expansion and economic development. Nashville’s government reform efforts present one model for achieving this goal, and show that economic and population growth benefits can accrue as well.

About the Author

Jeff Wachter is an independent researcher with a master’s degree in history from George Mason University, specializing in the development of American cities and suburbs. His research interests and experience include metropolitan governance, community and economic development, and housing and transportation issues. Previous work has included studies on the city/county consolidation in Indianapolis, Indiana, and Louisville, Kentucky; suburban identity in Richmond, Virginia; and the suburbanization of ethnic communities in Metro Atlanta.

Appendix

Comparative cities were determined by population and the percent of the city's employment in manufacturing. Comp cities are those that had a population of 100,000 or more in 1960, and 20 percent or greater manufacturing employment. Comp MSAs are the Metropolitan Areas that the comp cities are in according to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau. Cities and metro areas in the West Census Region were disregarded due to the significant differences between Western city development and Eastern, Midwestern, and Southern cities.

City	State	Census Region	Census Division
Birmingham	Alabama	South	East South Central
Bridgeport	Conneticut	Northeast	New England
Harford	Conneticut	Northeast	New England
New Haven	Conneticut	Northeast	New England
Waterbury	Conneticut	Northeast	New England
Columbus	Georgia	South	South Atlantic
Chicago	Illinois	Midwest	East North Central
Peoria	Illinois	Midwest	East North Central
Rockford	Illinois	Midwest	East North Central
Evansville	Indiana	Midwest	East North Central
Fort Wayne	Indiana	Midwest	East North Central
Gary	Indiana	Midwest	East North Central
Hammond	Indiana	Midwest	East North Central
Indianapolis	Indiana	Midwest	East North Central
South Bend	Indiana	Midwest	East North Central
Des Moines	Iowa	Midwest	West North Central
Kansas City	Kansas	Midwest	West North Central
Wichita	Kansas	Midwest	West North Central
Louisville	Kentucky	South	South Atlantic
Baltimore	Maryland	South	South Atlantic
Boston	Massachusetts	Northeast	New England
Cambridge	Massachusetts	Northeast	New England
New Bedford	Massachusetts	Northeast	New England
Springfield	Massachusetts	Northeast	New England
Worcester	Massachusetts	Northeast	New England
Dearborn	Michigan	Midwest	East North Central
Detroit	Michigan	Midwest	East North Central
Flint	Michigan	Midwest	East North Central

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City	State	Census Region	Census Division
Grand Rapids	Michigan	Midwest	East North Central
Lansing	Michigan	Midwest	East North Central
Minneapolis	Minnesota	Midwest	West North Central
St. Paul	Minnesota	Midwest	West North Central
Kansas City	Missouri	Midwest	West North Central
St. Louis	Omaha	Nebraska	West North Central
Omaha	Nebraska	Midwest	West North Central
Camden	New Jersey	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Elizabeth	New Jersey	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Jersey City	New Jersey	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Newark	New Jersey	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Paterson	New Jersey	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Trenton	New Jersey	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Buffalo	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
New York City	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Niagara Falls	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Rochester	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Syracuse	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Utica	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Yonkers	New York	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Charlotte	North Carolina	South	South Atlantic
Greensboro	North Carolina	South	South Atlantic
Winston-Salem	North Carolina	South	South Atlantic
Akron	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Canton	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Cincinnati	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Cleveland	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Columbus	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Dayton	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Toledo	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Youngstown	Ohio	Midwest	East North Central
Allentown	Pennsylvania	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Erie	Pennsylvania	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	Northeast	Middle Atlantic
Scranton	Pennsylvania	Northeast	Middle Atlantic

City	State	Census Region	Census Division
Providence	Rhode Island	Northeast	New England
Chattanooga	Tennessee	South	East South Central
Knoxville	Tennessee	South	East South Central
Memphis	Tennessee	South	East South Central
Nashville-Davidson	Tennessee	South	East South Central
Dallas	Texas	South	West South Central
Fort Worth	Texas	South	West South Central
Newport News	Virginia	South	West South Central
Porthsmouth	Virginia	South	South Atlantic
Richmond	Virginia	South	South Atlantic
Milwaukee	Wisconsin	Midwest	East North Central

Endnotes

- 1** For the purposes of this study, when Metropolitan Statistical Areas are analyzed, 2010 definitions will be used. For the Nashville metro area this means the counties of Cannon, Cheatham, Davidson, Dickson, Hickman, Macon, Robertson, Rutherford, Smith, Sumner, Trousdale, Williamson, and Wilson.
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26	Hawkins, 38-39.	48	Booth, 31.
27	Hawkins, 39.	49	Hawkins, 51-52.
28	Hawkins, 43.	50	Hawkins, 54.
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32	Booth, 18.	54	Booth, 73-74.
33	Hawkins, 47.	55	Hawkins, 61.
34	Booth, 34.	56	Erickson, 2010, 165.
35	Hawkins, 46.	57	Booth, 75.
36	Booth, 19-20.	58	Booth, 72.
37	Hawkins, 48, 49.	59	Hawkins, 59.
38	Booth, 20.	60	Booth, 77.
39	Hawkins, 49.	61	Booth, 76.
40	James C. Coomer and Charlie B. Tyler, <i>Nashville Metropolitan Government: The First Decade</i> (Knoxville, TN: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee, 1974): 12.	62	Hawkins, 60; Booth, 79.
41	Booth, 46.	63	Coomer and Tyler, 14.
42	Booth, 49.	64	Booth, 77.
43	Hawkins, 50.	65	Hawkins, 70.
44	Booth, 34.	66	Booth, 81.
45	Booth, 33.	67	Hawkins, 71.
46	Booth, 33.	68	Hawkins, 71-72.
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